01 / WHO SUPPLIED MORE
THE RUSSIA TRADE FILES / 01
Trade finds
another way.
The whole world. Two hubs. Russia on the other side. Follow every reported supplier to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—and the goods these countries export to Russia.
UN COMTRADE · 2014 →ANNUAL + MONTHLY · CURRENT USD
THE STORY IN THE CHANGE
Where did the growth go?
One pre-war baseline. One comparison year. Increases, declines and missing observations side by side.
02 + 03 / CATEGORIES, DECLINES AND NET CHANGE
The donuts divide positive changes in observed categories. Declines and the net change appear separately. Exports to Russia and imports from Russia use the same selected country’s declarations.
Which categories declined?
All categories · exact values
Which categories declined?
All categories · exact values
04 / THE PARALLEL ROUTES
Did the neighbouring markets grow too?
World imports and separately declared exports to Russia. These amounts are not added into one route and do not identify the same shipments.
How the changes are calculated and sourced
Compact chart labels are rounded; tables and downloaded rows retain exact source and calculated decimals.
Calculated available original HS6 subtotals in current USD, rather than official TOTAL or price-adjusted volumes. 2022 is a transition year; growth after 2019 is not a causal estimate of the invasion’s effect. Broad chapters do not establish military use or sanctions violations.
Loading the evidence…
SUPPLIERS → BOTH HUBS → RUSSIA
—
KazakhstanKyrgyzstanExports to Russia
01 / THE BIG PICTURE
Two hubs. The whole picture.
World imports and exports to Russia are separate series. Select a period to update the map and research tables.
Imports from all origins
Exports to Russia
WHICH CATEGORIES GREW
Take the growth apart.
Annual stacked columns in current USD. The five categories with the largest positive increases from the selected baseline have their own colours; the rest stays grey. Each chart keeps the same categories across every year.
Did growth start before the full-scale invasion? Select baseline 2014 and end year 2021. In April 2022, the Bank of Russia described building financial buffers and domestic payment infrastructure since 2014. This documents preparation for financial sanctions; the trade series alone cannot establish that routes through these hubs were arranged beforehand. Kazakhstan’s 2020–2022 detail gap limits assessment of a pre-invasion buildup. Broad chapters can change composition between HS revisions.
Bank of Russia · 18 April 2022 ↗
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Always all goods at HS2 level, independent of the product and month selected above. Height = observed annual subtotal, not a 100% share. Other = subtotal minus highlighted categories. A missing category is not zero; incomplete columns stay blank. Kazakhstan 2020–2022 has the coverage limitation described below.
02 / FOLLOW THE SUPPLIERS
Who supplies the two hubs?
Every reported origin in one place. Shares use each hub’s World subtotal as the denominator. Russia also appears as a supplier; imports from Russia are not evidence of sanctions circumvention.
Five suppliers under the microscope
Research prompts inspired by Svyatoslav Polyakov’s analysis. Kursiv Uzbekistan · 9 July 2026 ↗
Korea and Georgia
How much growth comes from passenger cars?
Germany
Did growth persist or reverse?
Türkiye
Separate jewellery from machinery.
Italy
Compare growth with pandemic recovery.
A large percentage from a tiny base can be a small flow. Check dollar growth, duration and composition.
The chart and table use warehouse observations and the goods selected above. HS 87 includes vehicles beyond passenger cars; HS 71 includes other precious metals and stones. These chapters alone cannot isolate passenger-car or jewellery shares.
The annual table also compares supplier declarations with hub imports. Mirror gap = reported exports minus reported imports. A discrepancy alone does not establish hidden re-export; the map uses import declarations.
03 / MATCH THE GOODS
What comes in.
What goes to Russia.
For every HS chapter, compare World imports, exports to Russia, and reliance on the Russian market. The ranking highlights simultaneous growth in both flows against 2019.
Rank = the smaller of the positive import and Russia-export changes. This is an exploratory ranking, not an estimate of re-exports. Select a chapter to explore its suppliers. Chapters can contain different products.
04 / TEST THE DETOUR
Less direct. More to the hubs?
An independent annual view from exporters’ declarations. The same suppliers, the same goods, three markets: Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The panel includes only suppliers reporting all three links in both 2019 and the selected year.
Suppliers outside the matched panel
OTHER SUPPLIERS / DIRECT TRADE
Who is selling more to Russia?
Separate annual export declarations. Compare the same goods and reference year; a large percentage increase from a small base is not a large flow.
TWO DIRECTIONS / TYPES OF GOODS
China and Russia. What changed?
Direct exports to Russia and imports from Russia are two different series. Apply the same lens to other countries.
Bilateral data provenance
The default 2019 baseline precedes the invasion. The year 2022 includes periods before and after 24 February. Current USD also reflect prices; HS revisions can change category composition. Missing declarations are not filled.
South Korea (KOR) and North Korea (PRK) are different countries. The MSMT’s May 2025 report documents arms transfers between North Korea and Russia. Ordinary customs statistics do not cover all military transfers. An absent trade record does not establish that nothing moved.
MSMT · Military cooperation and arms transfers · May 2025 ↗05 / EVIDENCE & LIMITS
Test the hypothesis.
Don’t assume the conclusion.
What we aggregate
Amounts are calculated sums of available original HS6 records in current USD. Each latest revised observation enters once. World partner rows are never added to bilateral rows. These are observed merchandise subtotals, not the official TOTAL series or inflation-adjusted volumes.
Two reporting perspectives
The map uses the hubs’ import declarations and their exports to Russia. The supplier tables and bilateral charts separately use the selected countries’ declarations. Imports are generally CIF, exports FOB. Mirror values can differ because of valuation, timing, origin or errors; they are never added together.
A verified coverage limitation
Audit: 26 September 2026. Kazakhstan’s available detail for 2020–2022 is below national totals. For 2021, the warehouse HS6 import subtotal is USD 27,751,611,648.923; the ministry reported USD 41.2 billion for all merchandise imports. We do not splice or estimate the difference. The comparison uses 2019; warehouse changes are not estimates of the entire market.
Kazakhstan Ministry · 2021 foreign trade ↗Co-movement is not the same shipment
Growth can reflect domestic demand, local production, prices, inventories or re-export. HS2 is a broad category; HS revisions can change its composition. The four selectable HS6 codes are unchanged between HS 2017 and 2022. These tables do not prove sanctions violations or that the entire direct-trade decline moved to these hubs.
Coverage and source provenance
Research framework
EBRD’s research compares direct and intermediated trade at HS6 level and distinguishes sanctioned products. Our tables are descriptive exploration: without a product-level sanctions list, control group and transaction records, they do not provide a causal estimate.
Chupilkin, Javorcik & Plekhanov · The Eurasian roundabout · EBRD Working Paper 276 ↗UN Comtrade · Confidentiality and aggregation ↗WCO · HS 2022 classification changes · Annex IV–B ↗